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Optical access networks connect multiple endpoints to a common network node via 
shared fibre infrastructure. They will play a vital role to scale up the number of users 
in quantum key distribution (QKD) networks. However, the presence of power splitters 
in the commonly used passive network architecture makes successful transmission 
of weak quantum signals challenging. This is especially true if QKD and data signals 
are multiplexed in the passive network. The splitter introduces an imbalance between 
quantum signal and Raman noise, which can prevent the recovery of the quantum 
signal completely. Here we introduce a method to overcome this limitation and 
demonstrate coexistence of multi-user QKD and full power data traffic from a gigabit 
passive optical network (GPON). The dual feeder implementation is compatible with 
standard GPON architectures and can support up to 128 users, highlighting that 
quantum protected GPON networks could be commonplace in the future. 
Introduction 
Multiplexing of QKD1,2 and strong classical data signals is an essential requirement for a 
seamless integration of QKD into existing telecommunication infrastructure. Whereas 
dedicated dark fibre links permit transmission of quantum states over long distances3,4 and in 
harsh field environments5-8, the presence of classical data signals in a live fibre makes the 
retrieval of quantum information more difficult due to excess noise generated by inelastic 
Raman scattering9,10. Progress has been made on operating QKD over point-to-point links 
carrying high-speed data signals11,12. However, realising multiplexed point-to-multipoint links 
critically depends on new approaches to overcome the heightened influence of Raman noise 
in passive networks. In these networks power splitters are employed to address each user. 
In a 128-user network the splitter adds at least 21 dB of extra optical loss to the quantum 
channel, while leaving the noise floor due to Raman scattering unattenuated. Although 
existing mitigation techniques like time and wavelength filtering or power control of the 
classical signals13 strongly reduce the scattering noise, additional methods must be 
developed to integrate QKD in large scale networks. 
Integration of QKD in GPON networks14,15 is an appealing idea. In GPON networks 
eavesdropping is always possible in downstream direction, as the transmitted data is 
broadcast to all users. Every user can, in principle, intercept all downstream traffic16. This 
realistic threat has been acknowledged in the International Telecommunication Union 
standard developed for GPON, which supports encryption of the downstream broadcast17. 
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The keys used for encryption, however, are not secure even against simple attacks14. QKD 
permits to close this security loophole, providing the encryption keys with information-
theoretic security. 
In this article we demonstrate a method to integrate multi-user QKD18-21 in a GPON network 
which supports large scale networks. We first show that Raman noise normally restricts the 
achievable network capacity strongly. Then this limitation is overcome with the dual feeder 
architecture. In a dual feeder network, secure keys can be transmitted alongside full power 
GPON data signals without the need for post-processing22 or time-alignment23, making it 
compatible with this widespread optical access network technology. The method permits 
operating QKD with up to 128 users in realistic network layouts while keeping the advantage 
of having single fibre links in the main, multi-user part of the network. 
 
Figure 1 Quantum secured optical access network. a, In a passive optical network multiple users 
(ONU: optical network unit) are connected via drop fibres, an optical power splitter, and a feeder fibre 
to a network node (OLT: optical line terminal). We integrate QKD into the network using wavelength 
filters (trapezoid symbols). Quantum transmitters are installed in the ONUs and a shared quantum 
receiver is installed in the OLT. Each user exchanges individual encryption keys with the network 
node. b, Spectrum measured in upstream direction by inserting a 50:50 beam splitter in front of the 
OLT in an 8-user network. The spectrum shows peaks at 1310 nm and 1490 nm from data signals 
and a peak at 1610 nm from the synchronisation signal. The quantum signal at 1550 nm is completely 
obscured by the broad Raman scattering background. 
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Results 
Single feeder networks 
Figure 1a illustrates the combined quantum and classical network layout with a single feeder 
fibre between optical line terminal (OLT) and power splitter. For the quantum communication 
we employ an upstream quantum access network structure19, where quantum transmitters 
are placed at the network endpoints (ONU: optical network unit) and the single-photon 
detector is situated at the network node. In addition to offering the advantage of sharing the 
complex single photon detector24,25 between multiple users, it also permits an adjustable key 
transmission bandwidth per user. Each quantum transmitter sends individual keys encoded 
onto the phase of weak laser pulses transmitted at a rate of 1 GHz / N, where N is the 
maximum number of users the network supports given by the splitting ratio of the passive 
splitter. Pulses from different transmitters are interleaved such that only photons from one 
transmitter arrive at the quantum receiver at any given time. For synchronisation the 
quantum receiver broadcasts a 250 MHz optical clock signal downstream to all users. The 
clock signal at 1610 nm and the quantum channel at 1550 nm are multiplexed with the 
GPON signals at 1310 nm (upstream) and 1490 nm (downstream). We employ standard 
telecom wavelength filters for this (see methods).  
The classical signals are visible in the spectrum shown in Fig. 1b, which was measured in 
upstream direction by inserting a 50:50 beam splitter in front of the OLT in an 8-user network 
as shown in Fig. 1a.  We use a single 15.5 km feeder fibre and two drop fibres of 4.4 km 
length for this measurement. Two combined quantum and GPON ONUs are connected to 
these drop fibres and 6 further GPON ONUs directly to the remaining ports of the power 
splitter. The downstream GPON signal is broadcast with full launch power of 4 dBm and a 
constant file transfer between all 8 GPON users guarantees a sustained total transmission 
power of the time-division multiplexed upstream signals of approximately 1 dBm. The 
upstream data is transmitted with inexpensive Fabry-Perot laser diodes generating the broad 
peak at 1310 nm. The spectrum also shows peaks from Rayleigh back-scattering at 
1490 nm for the downstream data signal and at 1610 nm for the synchronisation signal. The 
broad Raman scattering background completely obscuring the quantum signal at 1550 nm 
shows that the majority of light scattered into the quantum wavelength band comes from the 
downstream GPON signal. It is transmitted with full power in the feeder fibre and its back-
scattered photons are not attenuated by the splitter unlike the quantum signal. 
To investigate the limitation imposed by back-scattering in the feeder fibre in more detail, we 
measure the secure key rate per quantum transmitter in this configuration for various feeder 
fibre lengths and launch powers. We keep the total fibre distance between quantum ONUs 
and OLT at 20 km and only change the ratio of feeder fibre F to drop fibre D. The two 
quantum transmitters operate at 125 MHz. For more experimental details see the methods 
section. Figure 2a shows experimental and simulated data for the secure key rate per 
transmitter as a function of the single feeder fibre length F. The data illustrates that in 
networks with low capacity, for example for 8 users, successful key exchange over all 
distances is possible if the launch power is reduced strongly. A launch power of –11 dBm 
corresponds to a 3 dB margin to the point where the GPON network stops working (see 
methods). For higher power the secure key rate drops and eventually no key distillation is 
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possible for all considered feeder fibre lengths. The problem, however, is much more severe 
if the splitting ratio is increased. Only very short feeder fibre lengths are supported in a 
32-user network even if the power is reduced close to the lower limit. 
The fundamental nature of this limitation is further illustrated in Fig. 2b. It shows a contour 
plot of QBER as a function of splitting ratio and feeder fibre length. The simulation takes only 
Raman noise in the feeder fibre into account as a source of error, neglecting, for example, 
detector and modulation imperfections. It therefore represents ideal conditions and normally 
the QBER will be higher than in the simulation. We assume an average photon flux of 
0.5 photons per pulse, a total fibre distance of F + D = 20 km between OLT and ONUs, and 
a Fourier limited time-bandwidth product11 of ∆ν ⋅ ∆t = 0.44 for wavelength filter width ∆ν and 
detection gate width ∆t. We assume an ideal splitter with insertion loss of 1 / N and the 
Raman scattering coefficient is set to βDS = 7.1 × 10–9 nm–1. The downstream launch power is 
adjusted to maintain a received power of –30 dBm which is 5dB below the receiver 
sensitivity specified for GPON class A optics17 (see also methods). Even under these 
strongly idealised conditions QKD cannot be performed over the entire simulated range as 
the QBER crosses the threshold of 11% for the 4-state BB84 protocol26. 
  
Figure 2 Single feeder fibre network. a, Secure key rate for the first quantum transmitter as a 
function of feeder fibre length F in an 8-user single feeder network for different downstream (DS) data 
signal launch power. The total distance F + D is kept equal to 20 km. Key transmission over the full 
length of 20 km is possible only for strongly attenuated downstream power. Shown in grey is the 
dependence for a 32-user network. Error bars correspond to 1 standard deviation of 3 consecutive 
measurements. The solid line is calculated using the numerical simulation described in the methods 
section. b, Simulation of QBER as a function of the feeder fibre length F and splitting ratio in an 
idealised multiplexed quantum access network. The simulation takes only Raman photons in the 
feeder fibre into account as a source of errors. 
Dual feeder networks 
We overcome this limitation by installing a 2 × N passive optical splitter and a second feeder 
fibre as illustrated in the inset of Fig. 3a. In this configuration we re-measure the dependence 
of secure key rate on the length of the feeder fibre. All GPON signals are transmitted with full 
power in this experiment (see methods).  Figure 3a summarises results for an 8-user 
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network with a 2 × 8 passive splitter. It shows that the secure key rate is lowest if no feeder 
fibre is installed and the full distance is covered with the drop fibres. This result is intuitive as 
almost all Raman noise originates from the drop fibres in a dual feeder network. Because we 
keep F + D constant, reducing F corresponds to increasing D and therefore the Raman 
noise, which increases with distance for short fibre lengths13. The decrease of the secure 
key rate of approximately 40% without feeder fibre compared to the data shown in Fig. 2 is 
due the higher launch power of the downstream GPON signal. 
Having demonstrated that the situation with F = 0 always provides the lowest key rate, we 
set up the experiment in this worst-case configuration and increase the splitting ratio of the 
passive splitter. This conservatively bounds the maximum number of users addressable in a 
quantum secured GPON with two feeder fibres. Note that although we limit the number of 
GPON ONUs to 8, this is not restricting the amount of Raman noise generated by the 
upstream signal as the total upstream launch power does not increase with the number of 
GPON users due to time-division multiplexing. The effect of more quantum users and more 
fibre on the drop side of the network will be discussed below. Figure 3b displays how the key 
rate per transmitter depends on the network capacity. The secure key rate remains positive 
up to a capacity of 128. Therefore, we show compatibility with an even greater network size 
than demonstrated previously without multiplexing of GPON signals19 which is mainly due to 
improvements to the single photon detector27. The total loss of fibre, splitter and filtering in 
this configuration is close to 30 dB which is equivalent to 150 km of standard single mode 
fibre with an attenuation of 0.2 dB/km. The average secure key rate per user is 0.5 kbps. 
 
Figure 3 Dual feeder fibre access network. a, Secure key rate per quantum  transmitter as a 
function of feeder fibre distance F in a dual feeder network. The total distance F + D is kept equal to 
20 km. Error bars correspond to 1 standard deviation of 3 consecutive measurements. The solid line 
is calculated using the numerical simulation described in the methods section. Inset: Schematic of the 
dual feeder network. The power splitter is replaced with a 2 × N splitter connected to two separate 
feeder fibres. The downstream GPON and synchronisation signal are launched into one feeder fibre, 
whereas the quantum signals is extracted from the second feeder fibre. b, Secure key rate per 
transmitter for varying network capacity with two feeder fibres. Secure transmission is demonstrated 
up to a splitting ratio of 2 × 128. Inset: Secure key rate over several days in a 128-user network.  
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Simulation 
The numerical simulation shown in Fig. 2 and 3 is based on a noise estimation using 
experimentally measured parameters (see methods). The noise estimation is calibrated 
through comparison with experimental data which permits us to investigate the effect of 
more quantum or classical users in the network on the key rate. Figure 4 shows simulation 
data of how the secure key rate per user changes when more users are added to the 
quantum access network. The network configuration corresponds to the experimental setup 
used to measure the data in Fig. 3b, i.e., no feeder fibre and 20 km drop fibre. We plot the 
secure key rate for four different network capacities of 16, 32, 64, and 128 users with each 
quantum transmitter operating at a speed of 1 GHz / N. The key rates therefore are lower by 
at least a factor of N / 8 compared to the data presented in Fig. 3b due to the lower 
operational speed. We keep the key session times to the values reported in the methods 
section, which enhances the influence of the finite sample size accordingly. Additionally, 
more users lead to more afterpulsing noise as the total detection count rate increases19. 
Nevertheless, the secure key rate stays positive for all network capacities as the data shows. 
 
Figure 4 Secure key rate in a quantum network with more users. The secure key rate decreases 
when more users are added to the network but stays positive for all network capacities considered. 
The reduction stems from higher afterpulsing noise in a network where more of the detection 
bandwidth is used19. The key rates are overall reduced compared to the data shown Fig. 3 due to the 
lower operational speed of the transmitters (see text). 
In a dual feeder network almost all Raman noise originates from the drop fibres. The QBER 
therefore increases if more drop fibre is added between ONUs and the passive splitter. 
Figure 5 shows how the secure key rate changes as a function of total drop fibre length in 
the network. For the simulation we set the feeder fibre length to zero. We assume a full 
quantum network with each transmitter operating at 1 GHz / N and a full GPON network with 
N GPON ONUs. Here, we increase the key session time to compensate for the reduced key 
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size in a quantum network with more users. Note that methods such as trusting the detector3 
or adding more decoy states28 could be used instead to increase the resilience against 
statistical fluctuations. For all considered network capacities the secure key rate stays 
positive for drop fibre lengths of well above N × 10 km, therefore showing that quantum 
secured GPONs are viable in a large range of different network architectures. Note that 
typically drop fibres are shorter than 10 km and instead more distance is covered by the 
feeder fibre, which will result in higher secure key rates. 
 
 
Figure 5 Secure key rate as a function of total drop fibre. Simulated data for a full quantum and 
full GPON network with varying capacity. Due to increasing Raman noise the secure key rate 
decreases with the amount of drop fibre in the network. It stays positive, however, up to total drop 
fibre lengths of more than N × 10 km for all capacities indicated by the dashed lines. More drop fibre 
can be tolerated in larger capacity networks because the optical power transmitted per ONU 
decreases with the number of ONUs due to time-division multiplexing. 
Discussion 
We have demonstrated that QKD can be implemented in typical GPON networks employing 
two feeder fibres between the network node and passive splitter. The GPON data signals 
are transmitted at full power permitting a smooth upgrade to a quantum secured network. 
Note, that a similar method would not be viable in a downstream quantum access network 
configuration18 where dual drop fibres would be required. Two separate feeder fibres are 
used in conventional GPON networks for PON protection17. If one link fails, the network 
switches to the second link and therefore reduces the downtime of the system. This 
protection scheme is more likely to be integrated in critical network infrastructure, where 
QKD could be of particular benefit29. PON protection is also included in the next generation 
10 gigabit GPON standard30, making the method compatible with the next generation of 
optical access networks.  
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Methods 
Quantum access network 
The QKD network consists of two quantum transmitters exchanging secure keys 
simultaneously with the shared quantum receiver using time-division multiplexing. Each 
transmitter implements a phase encoding efficient BB84 protocol with decoy states and 
biased basis choice, guaranteeing composable security in the finite size scenario31. 
Attenuated laser pulses with 30ps full width at half maximum (FWHM) are modulated to 
signal, decoy, and vacuum state levels chosen with probabilities of 85.7%, 9.5%, and 4.8%, 
respectively. The respective intensities are 0.49, 0.03, and 0.0005 photons/pulse. We narrow 
the spectrum of the pulses with a 25 GHz dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) 
filter based on a fibre Bragg grating to a FWHM of approximately 18 GHz to match a second 
filter in the receiver. The pulse width is broadened to 60 ps in this step. A phase modulator 
inside an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer encodes bit and basis. We select the 
minority basis with a probability of 1/16, our protocol is therefore strongly biased. The 
quantum receiver consists of a matching interferometer and two self-differencing InGaAs/InP 
single photon detectors27 operated at 1 GHz and –30° C with efficiencies of approximately 
26%, dark count probability of 2 × 10–6, and afterpulse probability of 2% for a dead time of 
300 ns. The transmitters are synchronised with the receiver with a 250 MHz optical clock 
signal. The power of this signal is 75 µW in the 8-user network and it is adjusted to 
compensate for the increasing splitter loss in networks with larger capacity. The transmitters 
operate at 125 MHz and are time aligned such that photon pulses arrive at the receiver 
separated by 4 detection gates. Polarisation and phase control is implemented in each 
transmitter using count rate and QBER as feedback signal.  
GPON and Raman scattering 
The conventional access network consists of 8 ONUs and the OLT. For ease of use we 
implemented Ethernet passive optical network (EPON) which in its physical implementation 
is similar to the ITU standard for gigabit-capable passive optical networks17. The network 
operates with a speed of 1.25 Gbps in both upstream and downstream direction. The 
maximum launch power of the 1490 nm downstream data signal is 4 dBm. The power of the 
upstream signal depends on how much of the bandwidth of the network is used. We 
measure an average transmission power per ONU of about –8 dBm at 1310 nm while 
sustaining full network usage by running a constant file transfer between all ONUs. When 
attenuating the downstream signal the network stops working for an ONU receive power of 
approximately –30 dBm. This is 5 dB below the receiver sensitivity specified for class A 
optics in the GPON standard17 and permits to reduce the launch power below the level 
required for a standard receiver. Forward Raman scattering of the upstream signal is given 
by13 ( )
qUS
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−
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−
−
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where PUS is the launch power, αq and αUS are the fibre attenuation coefficients for 1550 nm 
and 1310 nm, respectively,  L is the fibre length, ∆λ is the bandwidth of the quantum 
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channel, ∆t is the time-filtering coefficient of the detector, and βUS is the Raman scattering 
coefficient. Backward Raman scattering of the downstream signal is given by 
( )( )
qDS
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αα
+
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+−1
 , 
where PDS is the launch power, αDS is the fibre attenuation coefficient for 1490 nm, and βDS is 
the Raman scattering coefficient. On both the receiver and transmitter side a total of three 
filters are necessary to separate quantum and GPON signals and to reduce Raman noise. 
All three filters are standard telecom filters. A first GPON filter separates QKD and clock 
signal from the data signals. This is followed by a coarse wavelength division multiplexing 
(CWDM) filter which separates the clock and quantum signals. As a last step, narrow filtering 
of the quantum channel is essential to reduce Raman noise. To this end, we integrate 
matching 25 GHz dense wavelength division multiplexing filters (DWDM) based on fibre 
Bragg gratings in transmitter and receiver. Please note that the 1550nm wavelength channel 
used for the QKD signal is reserved in recommendation ITU-T G.984.5 as an enhancement 
band for additional services such as video-on-demand. Quantum key transmission is another 
form of additional service and therefore does not conflict with the recommendation. 
Simulation and secure key rate 
The numerical simulation is based on a noise estimation using experimentally measured 
parameters. Raman noise counts are calculated in the separate sections of the network 
using the formulas above and βUS = 8 × 10–10 nm–1, βDS = 6.8 × 10-9 nm-1, αq = 0.046 km–1, 
αUS = 0.076 km–1, αDS = 0.051 km–1, ∆λ = 0.14 nm, and ∆t = 0.127. Raman noise from the 
clock signal is also taken into account with βclk = 2.4 × 10–9 nm–1 and αclk = 0.051 km–1. The 
insertion loss of the power splitters is 9.2 dB, 12.7 dB, 16.3 dB, 19.6 dB, and 22.8 dB for 
1 × 8, 1 × 16, 1 × 32, 1 × 64, and 1 × 128, respectively. The insertion loss of Bob including 
GPON, CWDM and FBG filter is 5.5 dB (narrow FBG filter 2.5 dB). Optical errors from 
modulation and interferometers contribute approximately 0.8% to the QBER. The key rate is 
secure against collective attacks31 and is negligibly different from the most general attack 
available to the eavesdropper31. The epsilon parameter is set to 10–10 and the error 
correction efficiency is 1.1 times the Shannon limit. We only use bits transmitted in the 
majority Z basis for the final secure key. To compensate the reduction of the secure key rate 
from finite size effects we increase the key session time from 20 min for 1 × 8 splitter to 
30 min, 60 min, 120 min, and 240 min for 1 × 16, 1 × 32, 1 × 64, and 1 × 128 splitter, 
respectively.  
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